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GROUP HEALTH PLANS
A TWENTY-YEAR LEGAL REVIEW
HoRAcE R. HANSEN*

The financial side of medical practice-commonly called "medical economics"-has seen many innovations and changes in the
past twenty years, as organizations of people have pressed for better
methods of meeting the rising costs of modem medical care.' Along
with these changes have come notable adjustments in the law, illustrating again in a relatively new field, the adaptibility of law to
social changes.
A scant twenty years ago there was little more than an inarticulate desire for more access to health care, but progress in this field
was inevitable. Man's quest for security in life, beyond the basic
necessities, will probably never be satisfied. Having acquired a
social security system for protecting his income, at least to some
extent, it was natural for the wage earner to seek the means for
protecting his most important asset-his health. He was aware that
modem medical care was highly capable of such protection, but
only at costs that were completely unpredictable and often beyond
his means.
Organized labor took the lead in attempting a solution in 1939,
in the form of a proposal for national health insurance. Organized
medicine, 2 sensing a major threat to its traditional mode of practice, responded in two ways. It resisted the proposal in Congress,
and also, as a means of helping meet the demand while at the same
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. A sharp distinction exists between the art and economics of medi-

cine. The art and practice of the science is and should always remain in the
hands of the trained and licensed practitioners. On the other hand, those who
pay the cost should be free to make arrangements with doctors, on a mutuallyagreeable basis, for prepayment of the cost. Lay groups have been highly
successful in administering such plans for many years. Operating on a nonprofit basis, such plans have provided high quality medical care to many
people on a budgeted basis they can afford. See S. Rep. No. 359, 82d Cong.,
Ist Sess. pt. 2 60-62 (1951) ; Means, Doctors, People, and Government 119-97
(1st ed. 19535 ; Goldman, Voluntary Medical Care Insurance in the United
States 183-87 (1948).
2. "Organized Medicine" as it is used in this article means the local
medical society, and if a broader area is indicated, it includes the state
medical association and the American Medical Association. See The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 Yale L.J. 937 (1954).
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time preserving its fee-for-service system, it obtained enactment
by state legislatures of so-called "Blue Shield" enabling acts, giving
it control of prepayment mechanisms in most of the states.3
As organized labor was losing its program of health legislation,
4
it was obtaining health and welfare funds at the bargaining table.
5
Following the pattern of group health plans, it began to use more
and more of these funds in providing direct-service medical care for
its members.6 This development posed a new problem for organized
medicine, since large and important lay groups now had the potential for competing with its fee-for-service system on a large scale.
Control by laymen of the means of paying the costs of medical
care carries with it the means of arranging with the participating
doctors a negotiated method of compensation; for example, salary,
capitation, or guaranteed income, which-unlike fee-for-serviceproduces a predictable annual cost, an important consideration for
administrators of these health funds. Further, control of the funds
makes it possible to provide comprehensive medical care by coordinating all the facets of modem medicine; for example, a medical
3. See pp. 531-34 infra.

4. Labor health and welfare funds are governed by the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (A) (1956)
which provided that such funds shall be held "in trust for the purpose of

paying, either from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care ......
and that the trust shall be administered by representatives equally from the
employer and employees, and a neutral umpire.
"The amounts now going into these health and welfare plans, exclusive
of those going into pension programs, life insurance and temporary disability
plans, total more than $1,250,000,000 a year." Cruikshank, Labor's Special
Interest in Medical Care, 257 New England Journal of Medicine 866 (1957).
5. A "group health plan" as used here means a lay-sponsored (as
opposed to doctor-sponsored), nonprofit corporation, association or trust
providing medical services, usually comprehensive in nature, to its members,
subscribers or beneficiaries, the cost being paid in advance by individual
periodic prepayments, or through labor health and welfare funds, the services
being rendered by doctors appointed to a panel or medical staff, usually
balanced to include the specialties, and the compensation to the doctors being
on some mutually agreeable basis, such as salary, capitation or some form,
other than fee-for-service, which is budgetable as cost that is more or less
fixed. The most common types are the voluntary membership associations like
Group Health Association of Washington, D.C., or the labor health plans
like the A.F.L. Medical Center at Philadelphia and the United Mine Workers'
plans throughout the country (the latter, for example, expending annually
almost fifty million dollars of health and welfare funds for hospital and
medical care of miners and their families). See Group Health Federation and
Its Member Plans (1955) procurable at the federation offices, 343 So. Dearborn Ave., Chicago, Ill.
6. A resolution adopted at the first convention of the merged AFL-CIO
stated in part that the common main objective of all health and welfare
plans is "to make available to the members the maximum in terms of actual
prepaid health services, as distinguished from cash payments ....
" (Emphasis
added.). See also 257 New England Journal of Medicine 866 (1957).
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staff of balanced skills, a variety of diagnostic and therapeutic equipment, and the necessary array of technicians. Such coordination is
difficult to achieve at best, and would be impossible without an
adequate source of funds, singly administered.
While such use of labor health and welfare funds is designed
to place more and better medical care within the reach of the wage
earner, 7 organized medicine sees it rather as an economic threat to
the status quo. This view is understandable. A group health plan
providing comprehensive care on a nonprofit basis removes the fear
of a crushing medical debt which the fee-for-service system might
sometimes produce. This fact, along with the other advantages of
controlling medical dollars, gives group health plans great appeal.
Organized labor has seen these advantages and is pursuing them.
Considering that health and welfare funds are provided for in almost
all labor contracts, that they are growing in size, and involve many
millions of wage earners, together with the fact that labor leaders
are applying more of these funds to group health plans, it may
readily be seen that here is the greatest challenge to the fee-forservice system that the medical profession has yet faced.
Organized medicine is firmly committed to fee-for-service and
has long realized that it can best prevent inroads into this system
to the extent that doctors, rather than laymen, control medical
dollars. Its answer for this purpose is the "Blue Shield" plan, uniformly under control of doctors by nature of the special state acts
under which they operate. Blue Shield plans offer prepayment and
free choice of doctor, as opposed to a panel of doctors in a group
health plan. But because of unpredictable fee-for-service costs the
medical care offered is necessarily limited, in many cases to surgery,
in-hospital emergency, and maternity care.
While Blue Shield plans are serving some labor health and welfare funds, particularly because they are adaptable to a wide geographic area, their limitations of coverage leave much to be desired.
Yet, they do provide at least a partial solution to the problem of
budgeting for medical care, and do have wide public acceptance.
Their importance to this discussion is their role in preserving the
fee-for-service system as the exclusive means of access to medical
care."
7. See note 1 supra.
8. See Means, op. cit. supra note 1 at 185, 186. "I believe that payment
for medical care on a fee-for-service-as-rendered basis is outmoded. It is not
conducive to the best care of patients in present-day society. Instead I believe
that prepayment plans, which afford benefits directly in the form of comprehensive service, are today the method of choice."
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If the contest between professional and lay groups for control
of medical dollars were limited to ordinary, free competition between group health and Blue Shield plans, this discussion would be
unnecessary. But the competition is neither ordinary nor free.
Organized medicine possesses the means of purveying the indispensable medical care without which neither system would work,
and it has not hesitated to restrict availability of medical care as a
means of eliminating competition to its traditional mode of practice.,
This restriction has been effected by certain legal or ethical devices.
The legal devices include obtaining special state legislation in
the form of restrictive Blue Shield acts, asserting the common law
prohibition against corporate practice of medicine, and claiming
violation of state insurance statutes.
The ethical device employed is denial of membership by a
medical society to a doctor who participates iti a group health plan,
usually on the grounds that he is a party to a solicitation scheme
or to denial of free choice of doctor, both being so-called "ethical"
principles. Such discipline has salutary effect because of its great
harm to the doctor's reputation, and its effectiveness as an economic
weapon in eliminating the competition of a group health plan, which
finds it difficult to interest doctors in participation when they face
professional ostracism.
Use of these devices began in earnest twenty years ago and
gave rise to the famous Group Health casesY0 It has continued
with little letup and, with the recent activity on the part of organized
labor, has become more intense than ever."' Organized medicine is
again engaged in restrictive activities to stem the tide, and it may
be expected that a new rash of lawsuits will follow. The outcome
will undoubtedly have profound effect on the future distribution of
medical care in this country.
Whatever the outcome, it is certain to be influenced by the re9. See pp. 538-46 infra.
10. These cases involve the harassment by the local medical society
of a voluntary plan whereby federal employees in the District of Columbia
provided themselves with medical services by a prepayment system. See Group
Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F.Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938), aff'd sub non, Jordan
v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; United States v.
AMA, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
11. The 1957 annual meeting of the House of Delegates of the AMA
considered many resolutions from delegations of. state medical associations
complaining about the activity of labor health plans and calling on the AMA
nationally to take a strong stand against them by way of declaring them
"unethical," mainly on the ground that they did not conform with the freechoice-of-doctor and fee-for-service sygtem. See 164 A.M.A.J. 1231-45 (1957).
Apparently wiser legal heads at this convention prevailed and these resolutions were not adopted as being "unenforceable." See Time Magazine, June
17, 1957, at p. 40.
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markable body of law emerging from this conflict in the past
twenty years. It is the purpose of this article to review this law 2
and to observe its effects upon the growing competition in the field of
medical economics. Special attention will be given the anti-trust
aspects because of the increasing use of discipline against doctors
who participate in group health plans, as a means of eliminating
competition from that source.
I. STATE ENABLING LEGISLATION

The power to regulate conduct concerning the public health is
reserved to the states. Those statutes which license doctors' and
hospitals are prime examples of the exercise of this power by state
legislatures. On the federal level, there were attempts in Congress
beginning in 1939 to enact national health insurance, but the bills
for this legislation were not regulatory and merely proposed a
means of financing health care under existing modes of medical
practice. The strong opposition to these proposals from organized
medicine came from fear that ultimately the control of medical
dollars would slip from its hands into those of the government. This
fear was so strong that, although organized medicine had so recently opposed "Blue Cross" plans for prepaying hospital care,
it now hastened to organize "Blue Shield" plans for prepaying
medical care. Recognizing the sovereignty of the states in these
matters, it sought and obtained from the state legislatures unique
enabling acts for these plans.
These acts, with few exceptions, are restrictive in nature, in
that they limit administrative and economic control of prepayment
plans to the medical profession, to the exclusion of lay groups.
While the primary purpose of these acts is to control medical
dollars, they also secure exemption from the insurance laws and the
corporate practice rule.
A study through the 1957 legislative sessions shows that forty
states have adopted such enabling acts. Twenty-six states have a
restrictive type,' 3 meaning that in one form or another the administration, including economic aspects, of a prepayment medical care
12. See also Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 Iowa L.

Rev. 209 (1950); Notes, Cooperation in Medicine, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 373
(1951) ; The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics
in Organized Medicine, 63 Yale L.J. 937, 976-96 (1954).
13. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 28, §§ 304-316 (Supp. 1955); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 20-821 to -840 (1956) ; Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 9201 (West 1955) ;
See Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soey, 43 Cal. 2d
201, 272 P.2d 497 (1954) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 91-1-17(13) (1953) ; Fla.
Stat. Ann. §§ 641.01-.16 (Supp. 1956) ; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 99-1001a to -1016a
(1955); Idaho Code Ann.§§ 41-170 to -1718 (Supp. 1957); Iowa Code Ann.
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plan is given to the control of the doctors. 14 Four other states which
have restrictive laws have enacted parallel, separate acts authorizing
similar corporations to be formed for the operation of prepayment
plans by lay groups.15 Two states give limited authority to lay
plans.16 Eight states have open acts which give authority alike to
doctor and lay-sponsored plans.' 7 The remaining eight states have
no enabling legislation of any kind. 8
Restrictive state legislation was the subject of a recent lawsuit
in California between a group health plan and the local medical
society.:9 The members of the medical society participated in the
statewide "Blue Shield" plan sponsored by the state medical association under a restrictive act which provided that at least onefourth of all doctors in the state must participate and that all
doctors must be eligible to do so. The group health plan had a small
staff of doctors serving a membership in San Diego and obviously
could not comply with such requirements. This particular health
plan was incorporated under the general nonprofit act and was
in competition with the Blue Shield plan. Its doctors were ostracized
by the medical society, which was the immediate basis for the lawsuit.

§§ 514.01-.17 (Supp. 1956) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-1901 to -1914 (Supp.
1955) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 303.160-.240, 211.090(1) (g) (Baldwin 1955) ;
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1661 (1951); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 60 §§ 244-257
(1954); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 550.301-.316 (1948); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§
159.01-.18 (Supp. 1956) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 15-1401 (d) (1947) ; N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 420:1-:13 (1955) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 14A-1 to -26 (Supp.
1956); N.D. Rev. Code §8 26-2701 to -2713 (Supp. 1953) ; Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 1739.01-.15 (Page 1954) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 §§ 2851-1501 to -1519
(Supp. 1956) ; R.I. Pub. Laws c. 1598 (1945) ; S.C. Code §§ 37-1101 to -1127
(Supp. 1957) ; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 56-2902 to -2932 (1956) ; Vt. Rev. Stat.
§§ 5900-5912 (1947); Va. Code Ann. §§ 32-195.1 to -195.14 (Supp. 1956);
W.Va. Code Ann. §§ 3472(283)-(293) (Supp. 1957).
14. Control by doctors results from provisions in these acts which require that the incorporators or the majority of the governing board be doctors,
or that selection of directors be approved by the state medical association, or
that a substantial percentage or all the local doctors be actual or eligible
participants. Lay-sponsored plans obviously cannot satisfy such requirements.
15. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 32 §§ 595-624 (1957) ; Mass. Ann. Laws c. 1760
§§ 1-17 (1955); N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 250-260; Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 185.981-.985
(1957).
16. S.D. Code § 11.1101 (Supp. 1952) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
1302 (2A) (1945).
17. Conn. Gen. Stat. 8§ 5281-92 (Supp. 1955); Md. Ann. Code art.
48A, §§ 301-308 (1951); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 5606 to 5615-17 (1957) ; N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 58-16-1 to -16 (1953) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 57-1 to -20 (Supp.
1955) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §8 841-862 (1953) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 742.010.080 (Supp. 1955); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 48.44.010-.060 (1951); see Group
Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d
737 (1951).
18. Ark., Del., Ind., Mo., Neb., Nev., Utah, Wyo.
19. Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal.
2d 201, 272 P.2d 497 (1954).
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At the trial the medical society tried to show, in justification of
its disciplinary action against these doctors, that they participated
in a plan which was not complying with the special (restrictive Blue
Shield) act. The Supreme Court of California .stated that this act
was permissive,20 not mandatory, and if it "should be held to be the
only section under which a nonprofit medical service corporation
may incorporate, CPS [California Physicians Service-Blue Shield]
might exercise a monopoly in that field and thus raise other legal
problems."21 The legality of the group health plan was upheld.
This decision is cited with approval in a 1955 opinion of the
Attorney General of Minnesota involving a similar fact situation,
which states that:
The proposed corporation is not one which comes within the
scope or meaning of Chapter 159 [Blue Shield Act] as it appears upon the face of the Articles of Incorporation that the
members and incorporators are not doctors of medicine and that
the basic purpose of the corporation is to provide a means for
patients to organize for the purpose of securing medical and
dental care for themselves, their families and dependents, rather
than for doctors to organize for the purpose of offering their
services to patients as is contemplated by Chapter 159. It is,
therefore, apparent that the proposed corporation is not within
the scope or contemplation of Chapter 159.22
It should be noted that the Minnesota "Blue Shield" act is
permissive in nature, stating that "nonprofit medical service plan
corporations hereinafter incorporated may be organized under and
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter by not less than 21
persons, all of whom shall be legal residents of this state and duly
licensed and registered doctors of medicine under the laws of this
23
state."
In contrast, the Michigan "Blue Shield" act is nwndatory in
nature, and states that "no non-profit medical care corporation may
be incorporated in this state except under and in accordance with
the provisions of this act ... .-24 However, an opinion of the Michi20. The act states that "a nonprofit corporation may be formed ..
Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 9201 (West 1955).

21. Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, supra
at 210, 272 P2d at 502. (Emphasis and insert added.)
22. Op. Minn. Att'y Gen., 92 B 11 (Oct. 5, 1955). (Emphasis added.)
23. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 159.02 (Supp. 1956).
24. Mich. Comp. Laws § 550.302 (1948). Sixteen state acts have mandatory provisions: Ariz., Colo., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Iowa, Ky., Mich., N.H.,
N.J., N.D., Ohio, Pa., R.I., Tenn., Va. For citations, see note 16 supra.The Illinois act had a similar mandatory provision which was repealed upon enactment
in 1951 of a parallel, separate act for lay-sponsored plans. For citation, see
note 18 vtpra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:527

gan Attorney General holds that the control provision of this act,
which provides that the majority of the directors of the corporation
shall be approved by the state medical association, is unconstitutional
as being "vague."2 5 Itwould seem that such a provision might also
be held to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it is (a) class
legislation since it purports to give one segment of the population
exclusive economic privileges, and (b) an unlawful delegation of
administrative authority to a private organization, in this case
the state medical association.
A twenty-year survey shows no social or legal justification for
such restrictive legislation. On the contrary, in an economic area
where experimentation is desirable, such legislation tends to retard
progress in the search for better ways to provide access to modem
medical care, which yearly becomes more complicated and expensive.
A Blue Shield act wherein organized medicine says in effect-"you
may have access to medical care by prepayment, but only upon our
terms and at our fee-for-service price, and no other method may be
the subject of negotiation"--is not in keeping with free enterprise
and democratic process, and does not become the medical profession,
which prides itself on a scientific attitude in searching for answers
to strictly medical questions.
Thus, it appears that legal existence should not be denied a group
health plan which is properly operating under a general nonprofit
corporation act. The presence of a permissive type Blue Shield
act does not preclude it, while the mandatory type appears vulnerable to attack on constitutional grounds.
I. THE CommoN LAw RULE AGAINST CORPORATE PRACTICE
The "corporate practice rule" prohibits a corporation from
furnishing medical services for fees through doctors engaged and
paid by it. 26 The rule, which is followed in a majority of the states,
is usually grounded upon considerations of public policy,27 medical
licensing laws, 28 or professional standards.29 However, this view
is based largely upon cases involving plans engaged in the selling
25. Op. Mich. Att'y Gen., No. 2531 JApril 18, 1956).
26. Fletcher,Cyclopedia of Private Corporations§ 97 (Jones ed. 1931);
Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 Iowa L. Rev. 209, 211-219
(1950) ; see also Annots., 103 A.L.R. 1240 (1936), 119 A.L.R. 1290 (1939);
41 Am. Jur., Physicians and Surgeons § 25 (1942).
27. Bartron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309, 329, 2 N.W.2d 337, 346
(1942).
28. People v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 454, 200 N.E. 157,
163 (1936).
29. People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health
Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938).

GROUP HEALTH PLANS

of doctors' services to the public for a profit, 0 while group health
plans render doctors' services to their members on a non-profit
basis, thus distinguishing them from the rule."'
This distinction has been made abundantly clear in a number
of recent decisions. In the first one, twenty years ago, the California
Supreme Court invoked the rule against a corporation which sold
the services of hired doctors to the public for a profit to its stockholders. However, the court took great care to explain that it
would not apply the rule to a nonprofit corporation. The court
pointed out that the two types of activities are not comparable and
that "since the principal evils attendant upon corporate practice of
medicine spring from the conflict between the professional standards
and obligations of the doctors and the profit motive of the corporation employer, it may well be concluded that the objections of policy
32
do not apply to nonprofit institutions."
The California court underscored this distinction in a later case
involving a nonprofit group health plan which arranged medical
services for its members through a panel of doctors acting as independent contractors. The local medical society had boycotted the
plan and refused membership to the plan's doctors. In trying to
justify this conduct, the medical society made the assertion, among
others, that the plan was illegally engaged in the corporate practice
of medicine. The court rejected this assertion and stated that "this
principle is not contravened by permitting a group of interested
persons to form a nonprofit corporation to secure for themselves
33
medical services at a low cost. 1
A Washington state court found that a medical society in a
similar fact situation was in violation of the anti-trust laws and, that
in asserting its affirmative defense of unclean hands on the part of
the group health plan, had "failed to establish that the Cooperative
34
is operating for profit and therefore ultra vires."
In the earliest of the Group Health cases the main issue was
whether a nonprofit corporation in arranging for a medical group
to furnish medical services to its members was practicing medicine
in violation of the medical licensing statute. The federal district
30. Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans,35 Iowa L. Rev. 209,
216 (1950).
31. United States v. AMA, 110 F.2d 703, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd,
317 U.S. 519 (1943).
32. People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health
Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 160, 82 P.2d 429, 431 (1938).
33. Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soe y, 43 Cal.
2d 201, 209, 272 P.2d 497, 501 (1954).
34. 39 Wash. 2d 586, 663, 237 P.2d 737, 778 (1951).
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court found it was not, and stated: "Such a corporation, not for
profit, but for the mutual benefit of its members, is in my opinion
not engaged in the practice of medicine or in holding itself out as
doing so.""
The harrassment of this Washington, D. C., group health plan
by organized medicine led to the criminal prosecution of the American Medical Association and others under the Sherman Act. The
defendants attempted to justify their conduct on the ground that the
plan was engaging in corporate practice of medicine. In disposing
of this defense on appeal, the circuit court stated: "But in all the
cases we have examined in which the practice has been condemned,
the profit object of the offending corporation has been shown to be
its main purpose .... ,,36
The view that the criterion for applicability of the rule is whether
the corporation is nonprofit in character is supported by recent
opinions of the Attorney General of Minnesota3 7 and North Carolina.38
The corporate practice rule is a legal fiction which the courts
have adopted to deal with profit-taking schemes that adversely
affect the health of an untutored public. In the absence of applicable
legislation or a clear right of the executive to put down quackery
or commercialization of medicine, the courts apparently have felt
justified in creating the rule to protect the public health. However,
when nonprofit plans came to the attention of the courts, they saw
in them none of the social evils which gave rise to the rule, and a
proper distinction was drawn. No case has been found where the
courts have applied the rule against a nonprofit, consumer-sponsored, prepayment medical service corporation-commonly known
as a group health plan.39
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE INSURANCE LAws
Many state insurance codes define the business of "insurance"
so broadly that at first blush it would seem to cover a group health
plan. The factors in the usual definition include periodic payments
35' Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445, 446 (D.D.C. 1938).
36. United States v. AMA, 110 F.2d 703, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd, 317
U.S. 519 (1943). (Emphasis added.)
37. Op. Minn. Att'y Gen., 92 B 11 (Oct. 5, 1955). (Emphasis added.)

This opinion cites two Minnesota cases involving corporate practice for profit.
In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318 (1930) (practice of law) ; and
Granger v. Adson, 190 Minn. 23, 250 N.W. 722 (1933) (practice of medicine).
38. 33 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 43 (Dec. 9, 1955).
39. In all of the actions by a group health plan against a medical society,
the latter raised the question of corporate practice against the plan. See pp.

538-46 infra.
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for the coverage, the delivery of money or something of value on the
happening of stated contingencies, and an overall plan of sharing
risks among the persons covered.
There are, however, many features distinguishing medical service plans from insurance companies, 4 but the decisive factor is that
the former is engaged in furnishing services, and the latter in paying
cash indemnities. This is illustrated by a case involving a consumersponsored plan, wherein the court said:
To summarize, the distinctive features of the cooperative are the
rendering of service, its extension, the bringing of physician and
patient together, the preventive features, the regularization of
service as well as payment, the substantial reduction in cost by
quantity purchasing, in short, getting the medical job done and
paid for; not, except incidentally to these features, the indemnification for cost after the service is rendered.... There is, therefore, a substantial difference between contracting in this way for
the rendering of service, even on the contingency that it he
needed, and contracting merely to stand its cost when or after
it is rendered.
That an incidental element of risk distribution or assumption
may be present should not outweigh all other factors. 4
This same reasoning was applied in a doctor-sponsored plan:
Stated in terms of insurance, all risk is assumed by the physicians, not by the corporation, hence the only effect of requiring
compliance with regulatory statutes would be to compel the
acquisition 2 of reserves contrary to the established method of
operation.'
And one court adopted the same attitude to a profit-type plan:
The contract is not one of indemnification ....
The physicians
are engaged and stand ready to render their services. The Company can not be called upon to expend further money than that
already paid or agreed to be paid to them ....
Neither as between the corporation and the physician, nor as between the
physician and the subscriber is the compensation or any other
element of the arrangement between them affected by any contingency, hazard or risk. 3
These cases illustrate the majority view of the courts" and
should be decisive in disposing of any question that a group health
40.

See Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 Iowa L. Rev.

209 (1950) ; 167 A.L.R. 323 (1947) ; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 12 (1940).
41. Jordon v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
42. California Physicians' Service v. Garrison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 805, 172
P.2d 4, 13 (1946).
43. State v. Community Health Serv., Inc., 129 N.J.L. 427, 428, 30 A.
2d 44, 45 (1943).
44. See Annot., 167 A.L.R. 322, 323 (1947); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance
§ 12 (1940).
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plan is engaged in the insurance business. In addition, there is
another practical consideration. In such a plan the doctors are
usually paid some type of fixed annual income, so that when this
income is added to other fixed overhead items the total annual
cost is known in advance and, for all practical purposes, is fixed
in advance. The rate of dues payable by the members can easily be
calculated to meet this known cost. Thus, there is no need for the
establishment of reserves, regulation of rates and other general
supervision by a state insurance commissioner, as in the case of
insurance companies where losses are not so easily predicted and the
possibility always exists that heavy losses might cause insolvency.
IV.

ORGANIZED MEDICINE AND THE ANTI-TRusT LAWS

As indicated in the preceding sections, charges that a group
health plan is operating in violation of state law have proved
ineffectual. More to be feared by sponsors of these plans is disciplinary action by the local medical society against participating doctors.
This action consists of expulsion from the medical society if the
doctor is a member, or denial of admission if he is not. In either
case there is resulting damage to the doctor's reputation and professional future, serious enough to cause him to consider leaving the
plan. If he leaves the plan and others cannot be persuaded to participate for fear of the same consequences, the plan cannot function
and its economic competition is thereby effectively destroyed.
a. What is the nature of a doctor's participationin a group
health plan which leads to such disciplinaryaction?
Simply stated, it is the doctor's agreement with the plan to accept
a form of compensation different from traditional fee-for-service. It
may be a stated salary, capitation (stated amount per memberpatient per year), or a guaranteed minimum income (to put a
floor under an uncertain fee-for-service income) .45The
alleged sin
is purely financial and has nothing to do with the moral character
or professional competency of the doctor, which are usually the only
two requirements for membership in a medical society, as well as
for a license to practice.
45. The guaranteed minimum income agreement is used primarily to
attract a doctor to a new location. For example, in Colorado the trustees of a
labor health and welfare fund induced two needed specialists by such an
agreement to locate in a mining town, in order to improve the quality of
medical care rendered its beneficiaries. The local medical society, consisting
of eight general practitioners, resented this new competition and tried to remove it .by denying membership to the two doctors. An anti-trust action

resulted and was filed in the state district court at Trinidad, Colorado, in
November, 1957.
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b. What are the consequences of such disciplinaryaction?

A doctor who cannot get membership in a medical society is
usually professionally and socially ostracized by his medical colleagues. He may be excluded from privileges by hospitals " which
require society membership. He may be shunned by specialists whom
he may call upon for consultation. If he is eligible by training to
obtain specialty board certification, he may find it difficult to obtain
such a certificate. His malpractice insurance may cost more. Since a
layman associates non-membership with quackery, he will be under
a cloud with his patients. When he is cut off from professional contacts he is less able to keep up with the progress of medical science.
All of this adds up to serious damage to his reputation and his
income.
c. What is the remedy?

The anti-trust laws afford redress against these disciplines, by
way of injunction and damages.4 7 In cases under the Sherman Act,
criminal penalties are added.4 Whether the action is brought under
the federal act, or under state law in the form of a constitutional provision, a statute, or the common law, its nature is the same. All antitrust law fundamentally has its roots in ancient concepts of the
common law.
In the cases that have involved group health plans, the motivation for the disciplinary action was economic in nature: to eliminate
competition to the traditional fee-for-service mode of practice. Such
restraints are no different in the eyes of the law from those imposed
by economic organizations, if the purpose or the result is to lessen
or destroy competition. In one case the combination practicing
unlawful restraint is a medical society, in the other a business group.
Both are equally reprehensible. As stated in the leading case on
this subject by the federal circuit court, such disciplinary action
46. There is authority supporting the discretionary right of private
hospitals to exclude doctors from privileges. See Group Health Cooperative
v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash.2d 586, 667, 237 P.2d 737, 780 (1951).
A distinction is made as to public hospitals supported by tax funds. Id. at 66869, 237 P.2d at 780-81. However, note that the action of the society that precipitated the criminal prosecutions against organized medicine in United States
v. AMA, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), was the
enlisting of hospitals to deny privileges to Group Health's doctors. See The
American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized
Medicine, 63 Yale L.J. 937, 991 (1954).
47. In Group Health Cooperative, supra note 46, the Supreme Court
ordered a mandatory injunction and retained jurisdiction for three years to
assure admission of the disciplined doctors to the medical society.
48. E.g., United States v. AMA, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd,
317 U.S. 519 (1943).
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"is just as much in restraint of trade as if it were directed against
any other occupation or employment or business. And, of course,
the fact that defendants are physicians and medical organizations is
of no significance. . . ."49 On final appeal of this case, the United
States Supreme Court approved this conclusion and stated:
As the Court of Appeals properly remarked, the calling or
occupation of the individual physicians charged as defendants is
immaterial if the purpose and effect of their conspiracy was such
obstruction and restraint of the business of Group Health.50
In upholding the conviction of the American Medical Association, the Supreme Court found that the motivations behind the
disciplines were purely economic and that the purpose was "to prevent Group Health from functioning."
This case was brought under the Sherman Act, which is largely
a codification of the common law. In the more recent case of
Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Soc'y, 51 also
involving disciplinary action by a medical society against Group
Health's doctors, the action was brought under state law. In that
case, the Supreme Court of Washington stated:
At the common law, the term "restraint of trade" was deemed
to cover the practice of medicine.... [citing cases] The corporate activity of offering, entering into, and performing contracts
providing for prepaid medical service, is also a business or trade
at common law....
As our constitutional provision bespeaks the common law, so it
should be permitted to afford the same protection and serve
the same broad public interest which is available at common law.
Monopolies affecting price or production in essential service
trades and professions can be as harmful to the public interest
as
52
monopolies in the sale or production of tangible goods.
Then, commenting upon the medical society as a "combination" in
unlawfully restraining Group Health Cooperative, the court continued:
There can be no question but that the purpose of the combination
in the instant case is to pre-empt and control all contract medicine practice in King County. If respondents [medical society
and others] are successful in this effort, there will be no competition in the contract medicine field. Members of the public will
have no opportunity to choose between two or more plans offering this type of service. The result will be a complete monopoly
of this product throughout the country.5 3
49. Id., 110 F.2d at 711.
50. Id., 317.U.S. at 528.
51. 39 Wash.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
52. Id. at 638, 237 P.2d at 765.
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The applicability of anti-trust law to disciplinary actions of
medical societies goes back to English common law. The leading
case of Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n,5 4 brought under the common
law, was cited with approval in both United States v. AMA 5 and
the Group Health case.5 6 The Pratt case involved medical society
discipline against doctors on the staff of a group health plan called
Coventry Dispensary, which provided medical care to its 20,000
subscribers who paid it annual dues. The mode of compensation
paid by the plan to the staff doctors deviated from the traditional
fee-for-service system, and, as the English court stated:
The alleged sin was financial rather than moral in its character.
This was frankly admitted by several of the defendants' witnesses. The pecuniary interests of the Coventry doctors lay at
the root of the matter. The question of ethics, as that word is
ordinarily understood, had nothing to do with the case. The
plaintiffs were punished because they defeated the intended overthrow of the Coventry Dispensary. If the Coventry Dispensary
had been destroyed as a lay organization, then the local doctors
could obviously have taken such steps as would have increased
their area of private practice, and their emoluments would have
gained a corresponding expansion. This was the fundamental
object of the defendants. The nonparticipation in such
aim by the
57
plaintiffs was the head and front of their offending.
d. How does a medical society rationalize or
justify its disciplinaryaction?
Such discipline is always exercised in the guise of "ethics." The
usual charge is that the group health doctors are parties to a plan
which involves (1) solicitation of patients, or (2) denial of the
"principle" of free-choice-of-doctor. As will be seen by careful
scrutiny, these two "ethics" are neither definitive nor applicable
to group health plans, and are merely the excuse for disciplinary
action. In the absence of the excuse, of course, the action would be a
patent, economic pressure device to destroy competition. However,
in view of the invariable use of these "ethics" as justification, they
warrant examination.
1. Solicitation of Patients
The Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA, adopted in June,
1957, referring to a doctor's conduct to his patient, ends by saying
53. Id. at 640, 237 P.2d at 766.
54. [1919] 1 K.B. 244 (1920).
55. 110 F.2d at 710.

56. 39 Wash.2d at 645, 237 P.2d at 769.
57. [1919] 1 K.B. at 272.
58. 157 A.M.A.J. 753 (1955).
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in section 5: "He should not solicit patients." Nothing is said about
his participation in a plan which advertises by inviting subscribers
or members to join. The Judicial Council of the AMA, the "supreme
court of medicine," had this' question squarely before it in the
Landess581 case, decided early in 1955. There it was found that Dr.
Ben E. Landess was a doctor participating in the Health Insurance
Plan of Greater New York, a group health plan which advertised.
The Council held:
Since on the record before us H.I.P. is organized and operates
in accordance with law and may lawfully advertise; since the
quality of its advertising is not in issue, and since Dr. Landess
had nothing to do with the preparation or distribution of the
advertising, it is our opinion contrary to that of the state and
county medical societies that the conduct of Dr. Landess does
not violate the ethic relating to solicitation and advertising.',
The arguments for Dr. Landess asserted that the rival Blue
Shield plan in New York did far more solicitation by advertising
than did H.I.P. and pointed out that the AMA Twenty Principles,
points 5 and 100 specifically authorize advertising by lay-sponsored
plans.
In the Group Health Cooperativecase, the Washington Supreme
Court commented on the charge of the medical society regarding
"solicitation" by Group Health, as follows:
There is nothing in the record to indicate that there is any misrepresentation, overselling, or other impropriety with respect to
the way in which this soliciting is done. There would seem to
be no more objection to such solicitation, from the standpoint of
professional ethics or general public interest, than in the case of
Service Corporation's [Blue Shield] solicitation. The latter
organization engages a force of paid salesmen, and does extensive
newspaper and radio advertising in the sale of its industrial contracts.6'
In the Complete Service Bureau case, the California Supreme
Court disposed of a similar charge by arguing that solicitation by
advertising when done by a health plan, and not the doctor, is not
unethical in the eyes of the AMA or against public policy in the
eyes of the court. "It is clear that the activities of the nonprofit
medical service corporations in securing members is not 'procuring practice for a practitioner ....11,,12
59. Ibid.

60. 140 A.M.A.J. 686 (1949).
61. 39 Wash.2d at 614, 237 P.2d at 752-53.

62. Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal.
2d 201, 216, 272 P.2d 497, 506 (1954).
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In view of the foregoing it is likely that the ethics against
"solicitation" will no longer be asserted. This cannot be said about
about "free choice," the last remaining excuse for disciplinary
63
action and the one now being used more assertively than ever.
2. The Free-Choice-of-Doctor "Principle"
It will be noted that the new code-Principlesof Medical Ethics
oJ the AMA is silent on this subject.6 4 If we assume that the old
code is to be used as a guide, we note in its pertinent parts, that
section 4 of Chap. VII provides that "free choice" may properly
be limited if a "third party" has a "valid interest," meaning that it
voluntarily assumes the cost of medical care, and that in such cases
the plan is not unethical.65 Section 5 states that participation in any
plan is unethical only if financial profit is involved. It will be seen
that nothing in these tests makes a group health plan unethical by
AMA standards.
Looking further into other AMA "guides," we find that both
the Twenty Principles"6 and the Guiding Principles for Union
Health Centers67 expressly provide for "participating physicians"
and "medical staffs," which means panel or group practice and the
opposite of "free choice."
In the Landess case, the Judicial Council in commenting on the
Twenty Principles stated that while they are not in the nature of
"amendments" to the code of ethics, they -"are certainly to be
'68
given full consideration in interpreting and applying them.
All of the group health plans that brought actions against medical
societies had "closed panel" medical staffs and the merits of this
system, as opposed to the free-choice-of-doctor "principle," while
not a real issue in any of these cases was discussed and summarily
disposed of.
Not only is the "principle" an improper excuse for disciplinary
63. See note 11 supra.
64. 164 A.M.A.J. 886 (1957).

65. The entire section reads:
Free choice of physician is defined as that degree of freedom in choosing
a physician which can be exercised under usual conditions of employment
between patients and physicians. The interjection of a third party who has
a valid interest, or who intervenes between the physician and the patient
does not per se cause a contract to be unethical. A third party has a valid
interest when, by law or volition, the third party assumes legal responsibility and provides for the cost of medical care and indemnity for occupational disability.
66. See note 60 supra.
67. 158 A.M.A.J. 835-38 (1955).
68. 157 A.M.A.J. 753, 754 (1955).
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action, it is deficient when tested by logic and common sense. For
examples:
It assumes that all doctors are equally competent.
It issumes that untutored laymen can make wise choices.
It provides no means for elevating standards and quality of
medical care, in fact it lessens the possibility.
It eliminates the possibility, if strictly followed, for any
type of panel or group practice of medicine, which many believe
is the best way to provide the full blessings of modem medicine.
It is one of the means of selecting doctors, but by no means the
only one. Selection of doctors for a panel or group by competent
medical consultants on behalf of a group health plan is another
method having proven merit.
It is advocated by organized medicine as the only method
which results in the patient giving his confidence to his doctor.
But often greater confidence results when the patient knows his
doctors are selected for him by trusted medical consultants on
the basis of competence and skill. This is true not only in lay
plans, but also in private clinics such as the Mayo Clinic.
It assumes the patient will be able to pay the bill after making
his choice. If the patient cannot pay, then free choice is neither
free nor real. If a prospective patient feels he may not be able
to pay, he will often delay treatment rather than risk a financial
disaster, and in this case "free choice" becomes a mockery.
It precludes prepayment for comprehensive medical care.
Free choice harmonizes only with the fee-for-service system,
which affords no possibility of predetermining an actuarial basis
for complete care. The best that Blue Shield can do is provide
limited care because the billings it receives are unpredictable,
being based on fee-for-service.
It is asserted as a "principle" only where lay-sponsored plans
are concerned. Organized medicine at best has a questionable
right to champion "free choice" for people who are not asking
for it, and who in fact have decided against it in choosing a group
health plan with a selected panel.
V. JUDICI

VIEWS ON MEDICAL ETHICS

When medical societies use disciplinary action as an economic
weapon to eliminate competition, the courts -denounce it in emphatic
terms, and make it clear that indulgence in such conduct will be
treated no differently from cases involving private business corpora-
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tions. Nothing can be plainer than the right of everyone to require
the course of his legitimate occupation to be free from restraint. If
this right is violated, the courts will afford redress. And it makes
no difference if the combination of individuals or units committing
the offense is a medical society, a business group, or a mob on the
street. It also makes no difference in the eyes of the law if the combination or conspiracy committing the offense is motivated by
economic self-interest or by the loftiest of ethical principles. It is the
effect that counts, and if that effect is to restrain a lawful pursuit, to
eliminate competition, or to create a monopoly, the courts will
afford a remedy.
As the court stated in United States v. AMA: "Under no circumstances could the commission of crime be justified as a reasonable regulation of professional practice."6' 9 In the Group Health Cooperative case, the court decried the use of ethics for economic purposes and said: "In our opinion, the Society may not, through the
mere use of the term 'unethical', clothe with immunity acts which
would otherwise fall under the ban of the antimonopoly provision of
our constitution."' "0Again, in the Complete Service Bureau case, the
court disposed of the ethical assertions of the medical society by
stating simply that "none of the policies or activities of [Complete
Service Bureau] is harmful, injurious or inimical to the public health
or welfare."71
Even the AMA on one occasion denounced the use of ethics for
economic purposes. The Journal of the AMA on July 16, 1949,
editorialized:
Instances have occurred in which physicians, for political, commercial or emotional reasons, have endeavored to utilize the
Principles of Medical Ethics as a means of producing embarrassment, distress or loss of reputation of other physicians whom
they envy or whose open competition they fear. The Principles
of Medical Ethics were not designed for any such purposes, and
the attempt to utilize the principles
of ethics for such purposes
72
may well be in itself unethical.
Besides the ethical excuses for the use of discipline, medical
societies have asserted their "right' as private membership associations" to admit or deny membership as they see fit, without judicial
interference. The answer of the courts is simply to say that this is
true only up to the point where the action is used as an economic
weapon. In United States v. AMA, the federal circuit court said:
69. 130 F.2d 233, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1942).

70. 39 Wash.2d at 645, 237 P.2d at 768-69. (Inserts added.)
71. 43 Cal.2d at 217, 272 P.2d at 506.
72. 140 A.M.A.J. 960 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
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Defendants say that what they are charged with doing amounts
to no more than the regulation of membership in the society and
the selection of the persons with whom they [wish] to associate;
that under their rules disobedient members may lawfully be
disciplined and that disciplination does not amount to unreasonable restraint. This may very well be true, and in considering the
contention we are not unmindful of the importance of rules of
conduct in medical practice, rules which can best be made by the
profession itself. ... All of which may well be acknowledged to
their credit. Notwithstanding these important considerations, it
cannot be admitted that the medical profession may through its
great medical societies, either by rule or disciplinary proceedings,
74
legally effectuate restraints as far reaching as those now charged.
How then can organized medicine legitimately endeavor to maintain its fee-for-service system against competition from new methods
of paying the cost of medical care?
The courts have made clear that organized medicine is limited,
like any other calling or business, to the use of persuasion without
force.
In the Pratt case, the English court stated:
Upon considering the rules in question I have arrived at the
conclusion that they are in restraint of trade, and are void on the
ground of public policy. They gravely, and in my view unnecessarily, interfere with the freedom of medical men in the pursuit of
their calling, and they are, I think, injurious to the interests of
the community at large. It may well be that the opinion I have
just expressed will, if upheld, destroy the cogency of the defendants' scheme of boycott; but it leaves them with the safer and
more kindly
weapons of legitimate persuasion and reasoned
7
argument. 5
And, again in United States v. AMA, the court stated:
As we suggested in our earlier opinion, appellants have open
to them always the safer and more kindly weapons of legitimate
persuasionand reasonedargument, as a means of preserving professional esprit de corps, winning public sentiment to their point
of view or securing legislation. But they have no license to commit crime. When they go so far as to impose unreasonable restraints, they become subject to the prohibition of the Sherman
Act.7 6This, then, represents a limit to professional group activities.
73. Courts have intervened in the affairs of private membership associations, in non-medical cases. E.g., to see that a periodical is not denied
access to a news service, United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362

(S.D. N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 802 (1945);

to insure to a minority group the right to express its political views at the
polls, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, rehearingdenied, 322 U.S. 769 (1944).
74. 110 F.2d at 711-12.
75. [1919] 1 K-B. at 274-75. (Emphasis added.)
76. 130 F.2d at 248. (Emphasis added.)
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VI. CONCLUSION

In reviewing the past twenty years we find changes in medical
economics occurring at an ever faster rate, and find the courts keeping pace with the changes. There is a restless search for better
methods to distribute more medical care to more people. The cost
grows greater as new discoveries make medicine more complicated,
requiring a high degree of coordination between specialties, equipment and technicians. Experimentation in methods of organizing
medical services efficiently along with a prepayment mechanism, have
succeeded because the latter provides the financial means for
achieving the former. 77 Group health plans, using such methods,
have proved their worth and are spreading. Labor health and welfare
funds are giving these plans greater impetus.
As this activity grows there are bound to be increasing conflicts
with the traditional mode of medical practice. These conflicts will
result in litigation7 and the law reviewed in this article will be basic
to the issues. As group health plans find themselves involved in
these lawsuits to test anew their right to survival, they will find
comfort in the fact that in the past twenty years they have prevailed
without exception.
The apparent legal barriers to these plans, which so recently
seemed formidable, have been effectively removed. If a group health
plan follows in its operations the lessons in this law,"9 it should meet
no insurmountable barrier.
The common law prohibition against corporate practice of medicine does not apply to a nonprofit plan. The insurance statutes do
not apply if the plan provides medical services instead of cash indeinities.The "Blue Shield" statutes, if permissive in nature are
no bar to incorporating the plan under the general nonprofit corporation code; if they are mandatory in nature, they may be attacked
on constitutional grounds, or avoided by use of an unincorporated
structure with adequate safeguards.8 0
Attacks by organized medicine can be fully met with a strong
body of anti-trust law, headed by a decision of our highest court
which is undergirded by England's highest court. No sharper
rebukes appear in any anti-trust decisions than in those cases where
77. Op. cit. supra, at 185, 186.
78. See note 45 supra. In addition to the decided cases cited in this
article, recent actions filed in Oklahoma and Minnesota have been settled
without trial.
79. See Hansen, Legal Problems in the Organization and Operation of
Group Health Plans, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 14 (1951).
80. Ibid.
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organized medicine is taken to task for using ethics as an economic
weapon.
All in all, group health plans now have sufficient legal approval
to encourage their widespread growth. The same can be said for
any other method or experiment which is truly nonprofit, operates
by a service motive, and strives only for more distribution of good
medical care. The courts traditionally have shown great concern for
the public health, and by their decisions have indicated great impatience with any interest standing in the way of its betterment.

